We incorporate the effects of culture to generalise existing gravity models of foreign portfolio investment (FPI). The inclusion of cultural identifiers in FPI originating and destination countries along with cultural distances between them is analogous to the inclusion of gravity and institutional strength variables for each country alongside geographical distances in standard gravity models of international trade in commodities, services and financial assets. Although intuitive, this has not been considered hitherto in gravity models of international trade within the international business, economics or finance literatures. We estimate our models of cross-border debt and equity FPI using panel regressions on the IMF's CPIS survey for 174 originating and 50 destination countries from 2001 to 2007. We find that culture and cultural distance operate alongside geographic distance in determining global FPI patterns, and we find strong hitherto unreported cultural effects. Overall, our paper points to the importance of clearly separating the measurement and effects of gravity and culture -gravity always deters trade, but aspects of culture can encourage trade.
Introduction
The gravity model of international trade is well established in the international business, economics and finance literatures. In international economics, it has become the dominant empirical model of trade flows 1 . In international business, the gravity model has been applied to study patterns of firm-level internationalisation, modes of foreign market entry, international strategy, and the effects of culture on human resources, management and marketing 2 . In international finance, the gravity model has been used to study cross-border equity flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), international mergers and acquisitions (M&A), private and sovereign debt flows, intra-bank credit flows, debt and equity stock holdings, and equity return correlations 3 . It is widely recognised, however, that the distance variable in gravity models, which proxies for a range of information, transaction and other trading costs, does not fully capture the totality of these costs. This contributes to the 'missing trade'
problem (Trefler (1995) whereby the volume of international trade is less than expected, and to the 'home bias' puzzle (Lewis (1999) , Aurelio (2006) ) whereby investors hold fewer foreign assets than seems justified by the available diversification benefits. It follows that there must be additional costs of international trade in commodities, services and financial assets that are imperfectly captured by the distance variable in gravity models.
In searching for these costs, researchers have extended the basic gravity model by including additional variables that could influence the costs of doing business internationally, including the existence of regional trade and investment agreements; property rights, legal enforcements and restrictions; institutional strength, corruption and the rule of law; country, currency and political risk; security, violence and war; delay effects and governmental controls; and cultural effects such as language, legal system origin and religion. Despite recent advancements, however, the models tend to rely almost exclusively for their motivation on traditional economic and financial explanations of the role of gravity and culture. In this paper, we avail of the insights from the broader literature on the measurement and effects of culture to clarify the roles of, and extend the set of cultural variables that has been included in gravity models of FPI. The inclusion of cultural identifiers in the originating and destination countries along with the cultural distances between trading countries is analogous to the inclusion of gravity and institutional strength variables for each country alongside the geographical distance variable in standard gravity models of international trade in commodities, services and financial assets. Our extension of the gravity model to include cultural characteristics alongside cultural distances, although intuitive, has not been considered hitherto in gravity models of international trade within either the international business, economics or finance literatures. This turns out to be important, because we shall see that even after controlling for the standard gravity and institutional strength variables, cross-border FPI patterns are determined both by the cultural characteristics of the originating and destination countries -and by the cultural distance between the financial trading partners.
Financial researchers have become increasingly aware of the extent to which disciplines such as genetics (Maddox et al (1984) , Cesarini (2009)); anthropology, geography, history and philosophy (House et al (2002) ); and psychology (O'Grady and Lane (1996) ) contribute to our understanding of the determinants of national culture. National culture in turn impinges on the structure of financial systems (Kwok and Tadesse (2006) ); accounting conventions and practices (Gray (1988) , Salter and Niswander (1995) ); institutional strength (La Porta et al (1998) , De Jong and Semenov (2002) , Hitt, Franklin and Zhu (2006) ); and corporate governance (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) , Breuer and Salzmann (2008) ). All of these in turn impact persuasively on financial decision-making (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) , Stulz and Williamson (2003) , Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson (2006) , Reuter (2009) ).
Focussing on the areas most closely related to FPI, culture has been shown to impact on FDI, M&A, the modality of market entry, managerial control, capital structure, and on the structure of financial systems (Kogut and Singh (1988) , Sekely and Collins (1988) , Harzing and Joseph (2003) , Tihanyi, Griffith and Russell (2005) , Hitt, Franklin and Zhu (2006) , Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson (2006) , Kwok and Tadese (2006) , Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu (2007) and Kaufmann and O'Neill (2007) ).
We apply our models to explain cross-border stock holdings of debt and equity using the Amongst our main findings are that culture and cultural distance operate alongside geographic distance in determining global FPI patterns, and we find strongly significant hitherto unreported cultural effects. The existence of common language and religion between financial trading partners counteracts the gravitational forces of geographical distances, and these effects are greater for cross-border equity than debt. Countries that are less risky in terms of their overall political, economic and financial performance tend to participate more fully in cross-border FPI, but this propensity to reduce risk by diversifying internationally is not influenced by cultural attitudes to risk. In FPI originating countries, the degree of masculinity positively influences debt more than twice as much as equity FPI, and the degree of individuality positively influences equity holdings almost three times as much as debt. In FPI destination countries, higher (lower) degrees of masculinity, individuality and power distance tend to raise (reduce) cross-border debt and equity holdings by similar amounts.
Overall, our paper points to the importance of separating the measurement and effects of gravity and culture -gravity always deters trade, but aspects of culture can encourage trade.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the role of culture in gravity models of commodity, service and financial asset trade. In doing so, we focus particularly on the role attributed to culture in gravity models of FPI. In section 3, we present our data, describe our methodology and formalise our tests. Section 4 contains our findings and section 5 draws together our conclusions.
Gravity, culture and FPI
Newton's (1687) gravitational theory specified that the gravitational force between two bodies is a constant times the product of their masses divided by the square root of the distance between them 4 . Tinbergen (1962) and Linneman (1966) applied the gravity model to international commodity trade, and Anderson (1979) showed how it can be derived from trade theory. The relation between distance and commodity trade is now one of the best established empirical regularities in international economics. The first applications of the gravity model to FPI were conducted by Portes and Rey (1998) and Ghosh and Wolf (1999) .
Portes and Rey (1998) modelled a panel 14 countries from 1989-1996 and found that distance is negatively signed and statistically significant in explaining cross-border equity flows. They interpreted the distance variable as proxying for informational asymmetries, currency risk and institutional differences. Ghosh and Wolf (1999) [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Noting that the distance variable in gravity models of commodity trade proxies for transaction and transportation costs, and given that financial assets are weightless with low transaction costs relative to commodities, they surmised that distance should not significantly deter financial asset trade, particularly if investors seek international diversification benefits that generally rise with distance. Recognising that geographically close countries tend to be more familiar with each other because of direct personal contact through business and tourism, because their people tend to learn each other's languages if different, and because of indirect contact through media coverage, they included the number of telephone calls between country pairs to capture the flow of information. They added other variables to capture information asymmetries and the efficiency of transactions, including the number of foreign bank branches, the number of overlap in trading hours, the degree of financial sophistication and insider trading. They confirmed their prior finding that distance is strongly negatively significant in explaining cross-border equity flows, and they also found that it explains the other asset flows. If distance acts as a proxy for such information effects, they conjectured that more finely tuned proxies would lessen the role of distance in their models. They verified this, and concluded that the gravity model performs at least as well in explaining financial asset trade as commodity trade.
Another set of papers explicitly models international asset positions and FPI using variants of the gravity model that incorporate the separate and combined effects of geography, information frictions, and some aspects of culture. It has long been recognised that in addition to geographical distance, familiarity with trading partners, commonality of language, social customs, religion, and political institutions are important influences on commodity trade (Senior, 1827; Cairnes, 1874) . The inclusion of these variables in gravity models of commodity trade, however, is more recent. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997) found that controlling for regional groupings and common borders in their gravity equations, having a common language increases trade by 60 percent. In commenting on this, Anderson (2000) suggested that while the common language variable probably reflects information asymmetries or security of legal arrangements, the distance variable remains too large, implying the continued existence of unmeasured transaction costs. More recently, Lewer and Van den Berg (2007) found that controlling for common language, common border and regional groupings in their gravity equations, common religious culture tends to raise trade. Hofstede's (2001) uncertainty avoidance into a gravity model and found that exporters from high uncertainty-avoidance countries trade disproportionately less than others as distance increases.
Huang (2007) introduced
In gravity models of FPI, Flavin, Hurley and Rousseau (2002) included common language, legal origin, colonial links, and the degree of overlap in trading hours in a gravity model of equity market index correlations across 27 countries for 1999. They found limited evidence of significant distance or cultural effects, but consistent with La Porta et al (1998) and others, they found significant legal origin effects. Portes and Rey (2005) experimented briefly with common language and found it to be correctly signed and significant in some models (which they did not report). Rosati and Secola (2006) included linguistic similarity and a common border effect alongside market characteristics in their gravity model of European intra-bank flows. They found that a relatively simple specification with distance, linguistic similarity and common borders explains over 80 percent of the variation in large-value intra-bank liquidity over the 1999-2002 period. While these researchers consistently note that distance and the other geographic variables in gravity models of FPI reflect information frictions, Portes and Rey (2005) are explicit in distinguishing between information asymmetry and transmission, and they explicitly relate this to culture: 'Geographical distance is a barrier to interaction among economic agents and, more broadly, to cultural exchange' (p270). and it makes the common language and colonial variables insignificant for all asset holdings.
They conclude that distance proxies for information frictions. They then substitute their two other information friction variables, trade in newspapers and the proportion of foreign immigrants in the population, for telephone traffic and find them to be statistically significant for all assets, and they also find that a principal component variable for all three information friction variables is significant for all assets. They conclude that FDI and bank loans are 1.5 to 2 times more sensitive to information frictions than are debt and equity.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) Tobit), the latter being insignificant, when they add their correlations and legal origin variables. They experimented with both telephone traffic and the proportion of foreign immigrants in the population, but found both to be insignificant when they included imports.
Overall, our review of prior research on the role of culture in gravity models of FPI points to the importance of gravity in explaining cross-border trade in financial assets. This in itself is encouraging, given the newness of the research agenda and the poor coverage of consistent data across many countries. The models to date, however, tend to rely almost exclusively for their motivation on traditional economic and financial explanations of the role of gravity and culture, and this comes at the cost of ignoring the many insights from culture in international business, psychology and sociology. The role of distance in benchmark specifications is significant, but there is mixed evidence about the extent to which it declines when additional variables to proxy transaction costs and informational asymmetries are added. There is also strong evidence that legal origin is an important determinant, but mixed evidence about the roles of common language and colonial ties. The roles of culture or cultural distance have not yet been included, and it is to this that we now turn.
The concept of culture has been around for centuries, but it is only since the mid-20 th century that researchers have begun to systematically define and measure it. Taras, Rowney and Steel A society's degree of individualism refers to the extent to which its members tend to be loosely connected and responsible for their own wellbeing, rather than being more closely connected within cohesive groups that offer protection in return for loyalty which occurs in collectivist societies. High individualism societies tend to emphasize the importance of individual motivation with individual rather than group decision-making, and with compensation based on the individual's contribution rather than on the group's performance.
Employees in collectivist cultures tend to have long-term employment with one employer, and those in high individualism cultures tend to have shorter employment tenures and to switch jobs as they see appropriate to their interests (Hofstede (1980 (Hofstede ( , 2001 , Schwartz (1994) and House et al (2004) ).
The concept of power distance was developed by Mulder (1977) and built upon by Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 2001 to refer to the differential weights that societies assign to inequality in power, status and wealth, and the extent to which society expects that power should be shared unequally amongst its individual members. House et al (2004) trace the roots of this cultural dimension to Plato's argument for the merits of an elite ruling class in the 4 th century BC, to
Confuscian and Hindu philosophy that respects tradition and seniority, to the Hobbesian 17 th century recognition of the need for checks on individual greed and ambition. Low power distance cultures tend to disseminate information broadly, to provide broad access to education and resources for personal development, to exhibit substantial social mobility, and to encourage participation in discussion and critique during corporate decision-making. By contrast, high power distance cultures tend to exhibit localised information, unequal access to education and resources, limited social mobility, and to corporate decision-making by those in positions of seniority with limited input from subordinates. Confucianism, Hinduism and Islam tend to be high in power distance, while Buddhism and Protestantism tend to be low in power distance.
The concept of uncertainty avoidance is probably most familiar to financial analysts and researchers, particularly given the many tools that have been designed to management risk and to financially engineer preferred combinations of risk and reward. Initiated by Cyert and Marsh (1963) , the uncertainty avoidance dimension in national culture was developed by Hofstede (1981) to capture the anxiety that people face when exposed to ambiguity and uncertainty. Societies construct mechanisms to cope with uncertainty that fall under three main headings; technology (which helps us cope with uncertainties of nature), law (which helps us cope with uncertainties caused by the behaviour of other people) and religion (which helps us cope with uncertainties we cannot otherwise defend against). High uncertainty avoidance societies tend to exhibit greater accounting disclosure, less risk-taking, lower ambition for personal advancement, greater resistance to change, and higher average age in senior positions.
The degree of masculinity in national culture refers to the extent to which societies emphasize and reward the male characteristics of assertiveness, competition and success rather than the female characteristics of nurturance and support, and it also embodies the extent to which societal members are expected to manifest and perform these roles. Societies that score high on masculinity tend to exhibit behaviour towards achievement rather than solidarity, confrontation rather than cooperation, and intellectual independence rather than moral obligation (Triandis (1994) , Dooney, Callen and Mullen (1998) , House et al (2002) ).
Although the degree of masculinity does not correlate with the other dimensions (except for the dimension of uncertainty avoidance, with a statistically significant positive value in wealthier countries and a marginally significant negative value in poorer countries), this is the least accepted of the four because it is more difficult to distinguish its implied behavioural traits.
Data and Methodology

Data
Our primary data source is the IMF's annual CPIS survey of the aggregate debt and equity positions of countries and states along with the foreign asset portfolios of reporting entities with respect to each other. The portfolios are measured in $US millions, they are disaggregated into long-term debt, short-term debt, and equity, and the data is available on an end-of-year basis for each of the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . In order to avoid problems with volatile short-term financial flows, we focus on long-term debt and equity. We eliminate all transactions involving dependent states or entities 6 , small offshore financial centres 7 , international organizations, confidential transactions, unallocated data, and cases where there is insufficient data 8 .
The definitions and data sources of all variables employed in our empirical tests are provided in Table 1, and Table 2 provides summary descriptive statistics for all variables. As shown in Table 1 , we include the following cultural variables in our gravity models of FPI: common language; legal system origin; common religion; Hofstede's (2001) measures of the degree of masculinity, individuality, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. We also examine the role of Kogut and Singh's (1988) measure of cultural distance, including its decomposition into the four Hofstede (2001) components. None of the last eight variables has, to our knowledge, been investigated in gravity models of FPI.
Methodology
In order to provide greater clarity on the roles of gravity, institutional strength, informational asymmetries and cultural effects in our models of FPI, we investigate three sets of variables.
The first set of 3 variables in vector (1) comprises the basic gravity variables including geographic distance 9 between countries, Dist Geo , the level of economic growth in the originating (superscript 'OC') country, Grow OC , and the level of economic growth in the destination (superscript 'DC') country, Grow DC .
Our second set of 10 variables in vector (2) 
The inclusion of cultural identifiers in the originating and destination countries along with the cultural distances between these countries is analogous to the inclusion of gravity and institutional strength variables for each country alongside the geographical distance variable in standard gravity models of international trade in commodities, services and financial assets. Our extension of the gravity model to include cultural characteristics alongside cultural distances, although intuitive, has not been considered hitherto in gravity models of international trade within either the international business, economics or finance literatures.
This turns out to be important, because we shall see that controlling for the standard gravity and institutional strength variables in vectors (1) and (2), cross-border FPI patterns are determined both by the cultural characteristics of the originating and destination countriesand by the extent to which the financial trading partners are culturally distant.
Using our dataset of the latest CPIS information on long-term debt and equity holdings for 174 originating and 50 destination countries for 2001-2007, we derive a series of panel estimates to arrive at our parsimonious models. Following standard practice in the literature, we specify our models in natural logarithims, and we estimate them using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White-corrected standard errors. We do not include country-pair fixed effects because the distance variable, by construction fixed, captures these effects. Our testing proceeds in three steps. We first estimate our benchmark gravity model using the vector of basic gravity variables in vector (1). The estimating equation for this model is as follows. (2000) and Campos, Ericsson and Hendry (2005) , we sequentially restrict this specification by omitting statistically insignificant variables until our parsimonious models are obtained.
These provide us with our parsimonious Gravity vectors for debt and equity, which we designate by i G . We then introduce our institutional strength variables in the Inst vector (2) to form estimating equation (5) . As before, we sequentially restrict this specification by omitting the statistically insignificant variables to obtain our parsimonious institutional strength vectors, i I . These parsimonious models form the set of gravity and institutional strength controls that feature in our subsequent models using the cultural variables from vector (3). The general form of these estimating equations is presented in (6) . 
Here, the γ term in (7) should be negatively signed and statistically significant. In this case, countries that are similarly distant geographically will appear more distant to the extent that their cultures are different. Boyacigiller (1990) notes that cultural differences can be interpreted as a transactions cost, and it follows that investors seeking to minimize such costs will attempt to minimise cultural distance. We consequently expect a negative relation between cultural distance and FPI. We also expect this effect to be stronger for equity than for debt, because the former is based on more uncertain future cash flows, and because insolvency ranks debt obligations as primary and equity as the residual.
We complete our empirical analysis by setting the aggregate cultural distance parameter Table 3 presents our parsimonious models for cross-border holdings of debt and equity that include all statistically significant gravity and institutional strength variables. Columns (1) and (3) of the Table provide estimates for the debt and equity holdings using only the geographical distance variable, Dist Geo . This is correctly signed and statistically significant in both cases, with a larger coefficient of -1.91 for debt than the -1.66 for equity. Our estimates of equation (4) using the basic gravity vector (1) are presented in columns (2) and (4) of the Table. The geographical distance variable, changes very little in both equations. The coefficients on economic growth in the originating and destination countries, Grow OC and Grow DC , are significant determinants of cross-border equity holdings, but neither are significant determinants of cross-border debt holdings.
Results
FPI, gravity and institutional strength
We next add the variables in our institutional strength Instit vector (2) to derive our parsimonious estimates of equation (5) for cross-border debt and equity holdings in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 . The equations are well specified, with R 2 statistics explaining between 52 and 54 percent of the variation in cross-border FPI holdings. Looking across the rows of the Table, the coefficient signs along with their levels of significance are consistent for most variables in the equations for debt and equity, with all variables being significant in the equity equation and less being significant in the debt equation. Looking first at the distance variable, we can see that consistent with previous studies, it declines to -1.26 and -0.99 for debt and equity respectively, but remains strongly significant when we introduce the other gravity and institutional strength variables. This is consistent with, but somewhat larger than Daude and Fratzscher (2008) whose benchmark estimates of the distance coefficient for debt and equity are -0. 8 and -0.7, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) whose distance coefficient on equity holdings is -0.6. By focussing only on the gravity and institutional strength variables, while excluding the effects of culture, we find that a doubling of geographic distance leads to a 126 percent reduction in debt holdings and to a 99 percent reduction in equity holdings. The rate of economic growth in the origination and destination country continues to exert a significantly positive influence on cross-border equity holdings, with the greater effect coming from the originating country.
Turning now to examine the role of the institutional strength variables, the extent of bond market development in the originating country exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on cross-border holdings of both debt and equity, with the coefficient of 3.07 for debt being intuitively greater than 2.02 for equity holdings. Interestingly, the extent of bond market development in the destination country does not influence cross-border debt holdings, but it raises equity holdings, with a coefficient of 0.73, which is less than half the magnitude of the effects of bond market development in the originating country. In contrast to the role of bond markets, the extent of development of equity markets in both the originating and destination countries exerts a positively significant effect on both debt and equity crossborder FPI holdings, with the magnitude of the coefficients being greater for equity than for debt. We find that corporate accounting quality in the originating country promotes equity but not debt FPI, and that the same variable in the destination country is negatively signed and significant for both debt and equity FPI. This latter result is not intuitive, and we believe it stems from the lack of variation in the Bushman et al (2004) measure across the countries in our sample. Corporate accounting quality in the destination country does not seem to be an important determinant of cross-border debt holdings, although investor protection in the origin country is significant for equity. Investor protection in the originating country promotes equity holdings but not debt, while the same variable in the destination country positively impacts on both debt and equity holdings, with the coefficient being larger for equity than for debt. The level of country risk in both the originating and destination countries impacts negatively and significantly on cross-border holdings of both debt and equity 10 . (1) and (4) are the same as in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 . Columns (2) and (5) present our estimates of model (7). We can see that the multiplicative term is indeed negatively signed and strongly significant in both the debt and equity equations, so cultural distance does make geographical distance seem greater. Comparing columns (2) with (1) and (4) with (3) Columns (3) and (6) present these results. We first note that the geographical distance variable,
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Dist , remains negatively signed and strongly significant with coefficients of -1.27 and -0.93 for debt and equity, and that it rises in both cases when we include the set of cultural variables. This provides evidence that these cultural variables are exerting influences that are independent from the basic gravity effects.
Looking first at the role of common language, Clan, we find that it is positively signed and strongly significant, with coefficients of 0.65 for debt and 0.90 for equity. This result is contrary to Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) who found it to be insignificant. Portes and Rey (2005) and Daude and Fratzscher (2008) found mixed results, with the latter's estimated coefficient for equity being significant at 0.6 and insignificant for debt. Our finding is also consistent with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) who found common language to be significant in the range of 0.4 to 0.6. Our result demonstrates that common language is indeed an important cultural determinant of both debt and equity holdings, and considerably greater for cross-border equity holdings than has been previously reported. This supports the importance of information flows through which equity investors can keep abreast of foreign company releases, market sentiment and media reports when they are presented in a common language.
Looking next at the role of common religion, it is interesting to note that this has not been previously investigated in research on gravity models of FPI in spite of the fact that religion and finance share deep-rooted relationships. The mediaeval conflicts between Christian teaching on usury and the growth of European banking, and the present-day requirements of Islamic finance in relation to interest bearing instruments (Errico and Sundararajan, 2002; Jobst, 2007) are testament to this. In their study of financial market development, Stulz and Williamson (2003) conclude that civil law can explain equity market development, and religion can explain credit market development. We find that common religion, Crel, is positively signed and strongly significant, with coefficients of 0.49 for debt and 0.63 for equity. In contrast to this, we find that common legal system origin, Cleg, is insignificant in both the debt and equity equations. The former is consistent with previous researchers who have found mixed results, but the latter is inconsistent with Aviat and Coeurdacier's (2007) estimate for equity of between 0.5 to 0.7, with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti's (2008) estimate for equity of 0.3, and with Daude and Fratzscher's (2008) estimate for equity of 0.4. It is likely that the strong role played by common religion interacts to some extent with the role of common legal system origin in ways that merit further research.
Looking next at the individual components of cultural distance, columns (3) and (6) of table 4 show that distance in masculinity is positively signed and statistically significant in both the debt and equity equations with almost identical coefficients of 0.09. Distance in the degree of individuality enters the debt equation with a significantly positive coefficient of 0.13, but does not feature in the equity equation. Distance in the degree of power distance enters the debt equation with a significantly negative coefficient of -0.06, while also not featuring in the equity equation. Interestingly, distance in the degree of uncertainty avoidance does not feature in either the debt or equity equations.
We next consider the role of Hofstede's (2001) cultural identifiers in both the originating and destination countries. Although these variables have not hitherto been investigated in the context of cross-border FPI holdings, Table 4 shows that they have a significant role to play.
Looking first at the degree of masculinity, De Jong and Semenov (2002) argue that this cultural identifier is synonymous with support for competitive processes and outcomes and associated with greater stock market depth. We find that the degree of masculinity in the originating country, Masc OC , impacts positively on cross-border debt and equity holdings with coefficients of 0.578 and 0.222. In the destination country, Masc DC , also impacts positively and significantly in both equations with similar coefficient magnitudes of 0.414 and 0.513 for debt and equity. This implies that country A with a 10 percent higher measure of masculinity will tend to supply 6 percent more debt and 2 percent more equity to the international markets, and to hold about 4 percent more cross-border debt and 5 percent more equity assets than country B and vice versa. This is consistent with De Jong and Semenov (2002) .
Looking next at the degree of individuality, Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) argue from Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) that cultures with high individuality tend to be associated with management taking riskier decisions in their desire for success rather than protecting shareholder value, and that this leads to less debt in corporate capital structures. If this carries over to FPI, high individualism should be associated with greater holdings of cross-border equity than debt. We find that this is indeed the case. The degree of individuality in the originating country, Indv OC , impacts positively on cross-border holdings of both debt and equity with coefficients of 0.607 and 1.787 respectively, and in the destination country, Indv DC impacts positively and significantly in both equations with similar coefficient magnitudes of 1.842 and 1.563 for debt and equity. It is noticeable that the effect of the degree of individuality in the originating country in the equity equation is almost three times that for the debt equation. Taking the combined effects of the degree of individuality in the originating and destination countries, the sum of the Indv OC and Indv DC coefficients in the debt and equity equations are 2.449 and 3.350 respectively. It implies that country A with a 10 percent higher measure of Hofstede's individuality index will tend to supply 6 percent more debt and 18 percent more equity assets to the international markets, and to hold 18 and 16 percent more cross-border debt and equity assets than country B and vice versa. This is consistent with an international capital structure version of the arguments proposed by Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) .
Considering next the degree of power distance, the closest relevant research by Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002) finds that higher degrees of Schwartz and Sagiv's (1995) 'mastery' (which could approximate Hofstede's power distance) are associated with lower debt ratios. We obtain the strong result that in the originating country, Powd OC , impacts negatively on crossborder holdings of both debt and equity with coefficients of -0.695 and -0.036 respectively, and in the destination country, Powd DC impacts positively and significantly in both equations with coefficients of 0.434 and 0.587 for debt and equity. This implies that country A with a 10 percent higher measure of power distance will tend to supply 7 percent less debt and under ½ a percent less equity assets to the international markets, and to hold 4 and 6 percent more cross-border debt and equity assets than country B and vice versa. While consistent with Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002) , our finding in relation to FPI applies more generally to both debt and equity assets across a wide sample of countries.
With regard to uncertainty avoidance, we obtain the strong result that this cultural identifier in either the originating and destination countries does not impact significantly on crossborder holdings of either debt or equity. This result mirrors that obtained for the distance between countries on the uncertainty avoidance index. At first glance, this might seem counter-intuitive given the central concern of risk management in international portfolio choice. Furthermore, De Jong and Semenov (2002) find that a cultural appetite for risk (which proxies for the inverse of Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance) is associated with greater stock market depth. Using the cultural measures of Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) , however, Chui, Lloyd and Kwok (2002) find that higher degrees of 'conservatism' (which could approximate Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance) are associated with lower corporate debt ratios. In addition, Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) argue that because higher debt leads to greater risks of corporate bankruptcy, higher uncertainty avoidance should lead to lower levels of debt in corporate capital structures. Our findings imply that the uncertainty avoidance argument in the context of FPI applies differently to the area of corporate capital structure, because although higher uncertainty avoidance could lead to more debt than equity FPI holdings to mitigate perceived greater uncertainties, risks and informational asymmetries associated with equity investments, a more internationally diversified portfolio generally reduces risk. It is also worth noting from Country A with a 10 percent lower PRS measure of risk will tend to supply 7 percent more debt and equity assets to the international markets and to hold 5 percent and 4 percent more debt and equity assets. The question thus arises about the extent to which the cultural attitudes to risk avoidance exert impacts that act independently of the measured levels of risk. Future research might usefully consider cultural measures of uncertainty avoidance adjusted for the actual levels of country risk.
We can summarise our results using the variables in the Culture vector (3). First, controlling for an extensive set of institutional strength differences, the existence of common language and religion between countries exerts significant positive effects on cross-border FPI holdings of both debt and equity that counteract the gravity forces of geographical distances. These effects are greater for cross-border equity than for debt holdings. Second, with the exception of uncertainty avoidance, Hofstede's (2001) cultural identifiers of masculinity, individuality and power distance also exert previously unrecognised influences on cross-border FPI holdings of both debt and equity that are additional to the standard gravity and institutional strength variables. Third, in FPI destination countries, we find that higher degrees of masculinity, individuality and power distance tend to raise both debt and equity holdings by very similar amounts. 
Summary and Conclusions
Gravity models have been recently used to examine the patterns of FDI, to explain the internationalisation processes of MNCs, and to investigate many aspects of their operations.
In international finance, Portes and Rey (1998) and subsequent researchers have shown that while information frictions curtail the internationalisation of asset holdings, the role of distance remains significant. Despite these contributions, however, and although there exists a coherent and well-developed theory of within-country portfolio optimisation, the determinants of international portfolio allocations remain less well understood. Responding to this, we apply an extended version of the gravity models that have become important in the international business, trade, and finance literatures to investigate the determinants of cross border international debt and equity portfolio investments.
We applied our models to explain cross-border stock holdings of debt and equity using the FPI patterns, and we find strongly significant hitherto unreported cultural effects. More specifically, we have found that the existence of common language and religion between financial trading partners exerts significant positive effects on cross-border FPI holdings of both debt and equity that counteract the gravity forces of geographical distances, and these effects are greater for cross-border equity than debt holdings. In FPI destination countries, higher (lower) degrees of masculinity, individuality and power distance tend to raise (reduce) cross-border debt and equity holdings by similar amounts. In FPI originating countries, Hofstede's (2001) cultural characteristics exert different impacts on cross-border debt and equity holdings. The degree of masculinity in originating countries positively influences debt holdings more than twice as much as equity FPI, and the degree of individuality positively influences cross-border equity holdings almost three times as much as debt. By way of contrast, the degree of power distance in originating countries has a greater effect on debt than equity holdings. Finally, countries that are less risky in terms of their overall political, economic and financial performance tend to participate more fully in cross-border FPI holdings of both debt and equity, and this propensity to diversify internationally is not influenced by cultural attitudes to risk.
Overall, our paper points to the importance of clearly separating the measurement and effects of gravity and culture -gravity always deters trade, but aspects of culture can encourage trade. We find that adding Hofstede's cultural characteristics and the K-S measure of cultural distance provides useful insights to our understanding of global FPI patterns. This implies that culture, in addition to the well-researched variables such as transaction costs, taxes, information asymmetries, currency and political risk, legal restrictions and other controls, impacts on the home bias phenomenon (Lewis, 1999) . Our findings are consistent with Tesar and Werner (1995) and subsequent researchers who show that geographical proximity, language compatibility and trade links are more important than correlation structures for international portfolio investors. Our work also implies that although countries cannot physically move so that geographical gravity is immutable, and although cultural characteristics are slow to change over time, even with rapid migration, countries can take steps to evolve their economic, political and risk profiles. In order to raise both debt and equity investment to destination countries, we find that corporate accounting quality and investor protection would appear to be the most effective ways, with a greater effect expected on equity. Increasing the depth of the private bond market would also attract debt investment. Investor protection: The aggregate 'investor protection' index, an average of indices measuring transparency of transactions, liability for self-dealing, and shareholders' ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. Source: Djankov, La Porta et al (2009) .
PRS measure of risk:
A composite measure of economic, financial and political country risk, with higher (lower) scores indicating less (more) risk. Source: Political Risk Services, www.prsgroup.com.
Commonality of language:
A dummy variable reflecting commonality of the major languages of country pairs, equal to 1 if there is commonality and 0 otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) .
Commonality of legal system:
A dummy variable reflecting commonality of the legal origins of country pairs, equal to 1 if there is commonality and 0 otherwise. Source: Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Rose and Spiegel (2004) .
Commonality of religion:
A dummy variable reflecting commonality of the major religions of country pairs, equal to 1 if there is commonality and 0 otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) .
K-S measure of cultural distance:
A composite index of cultural distance constructed as per Kogut and Singh (1988) from the Hofstede indices. Source: our calculations.
Uncertainty avoidance index:
The Hofstede measure. Source: http://www.geert-hofstede.com.
Power distance index: As above.
Masculinity index: As above.
Individuality index: As above. Notes. Definitions of all variables and data sources are provided in Table 1 . 'OC' and 'DC' denote, respectively, originating and destination country. All regressions are performed on 7,980 observations of annual data over the period 2001-2007 using OLS with White-corrected standard errors to allow for heteroscedasticity. 
